US Led Regime Change via Covert Action—The Recurrent Apparition Wednesday, August 3, 2022

This episode is PART 2 of a dual episode focusing on the covert element of American public policy, aimed at destabilizing foreign governments, toppling foreign leaders, and launching military regime change. I will focus on two unique cases of covert action, Iran (1953) and Chile (1973) which explore in greater detail the use of covert action as a US foreign-policy instrument. Both examples provide a wealth of information on the structure, perceived uses and geo-political implications of covert action. In both Iran and Chile, one can witness the inception of US covert activity at a small scale using propaganda and political operations, and then review their impact as covert action escalated into larger scale operations employing economic or military options, ultimately ending in violent coup d'etat. A brief background to the Iranian case is provided which helps to explain, why US covert action in Iran created ripple effects that when far beyond its immediate use as a policy tool, creating much larger repercussions for future US administrations. Operation AJAX was the code name for the CIA-organized military coup launched against the democratically elected government of Iran, led by Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh. The covert operation was considered a success at the time by foreign policy experts in Washington, and later served as a blueprint and guide for future covert interventions. In Chile, the 1973 coup differed significantly from Iran, because the scenario developed over a longer time period and was precipitated by an aggressive policy of destabilization by the top echelon of US policy makers. Following the victory of left-leaning candidate Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election, the US began working against Allende, using diplomatic and economic sanctions and offering financial support to opposition candidates. Such pressures, combined with the inherent instability of Allende’s radical economic reforms, led to a collapse of the democratic state. On September 11 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the Allende government and began a 17-year dictatorship in the country that still haunts Chileans to this day. In both case scenarios I provide an analysis of the consequences of CIA covert action, the various policy considerations to be gleaned from each event, before arriving at concluding remarks. Overall, covert action is a high-risk proposition which carries an enormous level of uncertainly. It rarely produces positive results for the targeted country, when evaluated from a military or economic standpoint. And even when it leads to a small degree of success, there is always an element of failure involved, which leads to lasting repercussions. The current approach to regime change has evolved considerably from its origins in the Cold War due to modern information warfare. However, what remains clear is, the rationale remains unchanged, which is to ultimately, serve national interest and pursue foreign policy objectives at all cost.